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The "Social Dimension" of EC 1992: 




The economic unification of Europe scheduled for the end of 
1991 will be an economic and social milestone. The European 
Community (EC or Community) is the United States' largest trad-
ing partner and the EC's economic unification should create in-
creased opportunities for economic interaction. l The dramatic 
shifts which have occurred over the past two years in eastern 
Europe add even greater significance to the EC's coming eco-
nomic unification, particularly as various eastern European coun-
tries seek associate membership in the EC.2 Indeed, the unifica-
tion of Germany, which occurred on October 3, 1990, 
automatically made East Germany a member of the EC. More-
over, various Scandanavian and other countries have recently 
developed formal links with the EC through the formation of a 
European Free Trade Area.3 While the EC's population is cur-
rently about 340 million and is expected to grow, it may not 
reflect the Community's actual economic clout. 
The industrial and labor relations implications of the coming 
economic unification of the EC are considerable. Indeed, the 
"social dimension" or social and labor regulation aspects of EC 
1992 have been among its most controversial.4 Former British 
* Associate Professor of Management, College of Business Administration, Texas A & 
M University. 
I See generally Europe Without Frontiers: A Lawyer's Guide (A. Winter et al. eds., 1989). 
2 See Anthony Robinson, The Signs are Encouraging, FIN. TIMES (London) Oct. 30, 1991, 
at I, sec. 3. 
3 See Alan Riding, Europeans in Accord to Create Vastly Expanded Trading Bloc, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 23,1991, at 1. 
4 See, e.g., Europe's Social Insecurity, ECONOMIST, June 23, 1990, at 13; Workers Want Their 
Piece of Europe Inc., Bus. WK., Oct. 29, 1990, at 46. 
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Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's strident opposition to var-
ious aspects of the proposed social dimension5 played a role in 
forcing her resignation. Nevertheless, the current British govern-
ment has continued its opposition to these reforms, with Prime 
Minister John Major stating that the proposed social charter 
would render the EC less competitive in the global marketplace.6 
In contrast, the unified German government and the German 
trade unions have played a highly active role in supporting the 
social dimension proposals.7 Through social dimension proposals, 
Germany has been attempting to apply its industrial relations 
system, including its model of worker participation, throughout 
the EC.B An examination of the worker participation aspects of 
the European Company Statute, for example, shows clear evi-
dence of German footprints. 9 
This Article analyzes the social dimension proposals of EC 
1992, primarily from a worker participation perspective. Part I 
provides a political and historical overview of worker participa-
tion in European business decision making. Part II discusses Ger-
man legislation which requires that workers be allowed a role in 
business decision making. Part III discusses EC initiatives to ex-
pand the role of workers in business decision making. Part IV 
discusses the Community's proposed European Company Statute 
and the development of a worker participation scheme through-
out Europe. Part V contrasts the U.S. approach to worker partic-
ipation and other aspects of industrial relations to the EC pro-
posals. The Article concludes that these proposals already have 
had, and will continue to have, significant implications for U.S. 
labor-management relations, especially in terms of increasing the 
likelihood of congressional reform of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA). 
5 See Craig Forman et aI., EC Leaders Reach a Milestone Accord on Currency, Defense, 
Foreign Affairs,WALL ST. j., Dec. II, 1991, at A3. 
6 See id. Indeed in the Treaty of Maastricht agreed to by the European Community in 
December 1991, Great Britain was permitted to formally opt out of the "social dimension" 
requirements of the 1992 European Unification. See Scott Sullivan, European Takes a Giant 
Step, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1991, at 36; see also U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 23, 1991, 
at 13. 
7 See Timothy M. Devinney, Big New Europe Is Bad News For Free Trade, WALL ST. j., 
Nov. 4, 1991, at A18. 
8 See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. 
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I. POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Historically, industrial relations in western Europe have dif-
fered considerably from the typical labor-management relation-
ship in the United States.lO One of the distinctive features of 
western European industrial relations has been its inherent class 
consciousness. In Europe, industrial strife is often seen as "a 
conflict between two classes, almost two distinct orders of man-
kind, separated from each other by a wide and impossible gulf 
of habits, attitudes, and material conditions."ll 
This European class consciousness has led workers to become 
very active in the political process. In Europe, union members 
and their leaders have been more likely to align themselves closely 
with a political party than their U.S. counterparts. Great Britain, 
for example, has a distinct and powerful labor political party. In 
addition, some European unions have actually evolved from po-
litical labor parties. 12 
Workers in Europe, especially in Germany, have used their 
political clout to achieve what U.S. unions have traditionally pur-
sued at the bargaining table. 13 By flexing their political muscle, 
European unions have brought about comprehensive protective 
social legislation not duplicated in the United States. For example, 
European workers generally enjoy paid vacations, disability 
wages, protection from unjust discharge, and various other ben-
efits by virtue of national statute. U.S. workers generally receive 
these benefits only by way of collective bargaining contracts or 
other formal employer-employee arrangements. 14 
Given the wide scope of labor's legislative power in some EC 
Member States, formal collective bargaining is often rather un-
important. Moreover, the collective bargaining which does take 
place often occurs on a highly centralized basis. 15 Employers fre-
quently bargain through industry associations and union power 
10 See Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Law, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1397-1400 (1971). 
II ROBERT W. SMUTS, EUROPEAN IMPRESSIONS OF THE AMERICAN WORKER 2 (1953). 
12 See id. at 4. 
13 See Benjamin Aaron, Labor Relations Law in the United States from a Comparative 
Perspective, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1247, 1251 (1982). 
14 See generally Rae Sede!, Europe 1992: HR Implications of the European Unification, 
PERSONNEL, Oct. 1989, at 19, 22. 
15 See Bok, supra note 10, at 1404-09. 
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is similarly centralized at the national level. In Germany, for 
example, collective agreements typically establish national wage 
patterns for certain industries and serve as important instruments 
of national economic planning. 16 Worker input at the local level 
is, however, facilitated by way of various types of statutorily-
mandated worker participation schemes. The German worker 
participation approach is a particularly important and instructive 
paradigm because in many respects it serves as a model for var-
ious social dimension proposals. 
II. THE GERMAN WORKER PARTICIPATION MODEL 
A politically active worker and union movement has clearly 
affected industrial relations in Germany. Indeed, the nation's 
main trade union federation, the DGB, has proclaimed as its goal 
a "radical change of society."17 To this end, German workers and 
unions have successfully sought and obtained legislation mandat-
ing worker participation in management. The two major statutes 
are the Co-determination Act and the Works Councils Act. 
The present German co-determination law was enacted in 1976 
and essentially mandates equal employee/employer representa-
tion on company supervisory boards for all companies with more 
than 2,000 employees. IS But while employee representation on 
policy-making supervisory boards may foster a sense of "worker 
participation," in practice it does little for the individual worker 
with a complaint. Germany has, however, addressed the issue of 
day-to-day worker input at the "plant-floor" level in the Works 
Councils ACt. 19 This law enables workers in German enterprises 
employing five or more employees to establish works councils or 
plant-wide organizations composed of elected worker represen-
tatives. The law assigns certain clear areas of responsibility to the 
works councils, and requires employers to inform and consult 
with them on a wide range of issues. The works councils are 
institutionally separate from German unions, although some 
16 See generally J. Bauz Bonanno, Note, Employee Codetermination: Origins in Germany, 
Present Practice in Europe, and Applicability to the United States, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 947, 
947-66 (1976-77). 
17 Folke Schmidt, Industrial Action: The Role of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, 
in INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 39 (Benjamin Aaron and K. w. Wedderburn eds., 1972). 
18 German Co-determination Act, 1976 BGBI. I 1115. 
19 German Works Council Act, 1972 BGBI. I 13. 
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council members are also union members, and the councils per-
form some functions similar to those of local unions in the United 
States.20 
III. WORKER PARTICIPATION IN EC 1992 
A. The Community Charter 
On September 27, 1989, the European Commission (Commis-
sion) issued a draft Community Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights (Community Charter).21 This document states that a crit-
ical part of the economic unification of the EC is the promotion 
of "improved living and working conditions for workers."22 Ac-
cordingly, the Community Charter enunciates various principles 
concerning increased worker freedom of movement, improved 
opportunities for worker training, improved workplace health 
and safety, and increased protections for the disabled and el-
derly.23 
The Community Charter sets forth guidelines regarding pro-
posals on "information, consultation and participation for work-
ers."24 These guidelines, however, are vague. In addition, the 
Community Charter explicitly states that in developing the fore-
mentioned proposals, the Commission must take into account 
"the practices in force in the various Member States."25 Thus, 
while stating a general desire to standardize worker participation 
throughout the EC, the Community Charter also avoids pushing 
the matter too forcefully. The EC Action Programme,26 which 
the Commission adopted on November 29, 1989, develops the 
principles announced in the Community Charter in more detail. 
.0 See generally Michael Kaplan, Comment, Is Labor a Widget: A Comparative Study, 59 
TuL. L. REV. 1517, 1540-41 (1985) . 
• 1 Draft Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, COM(89)471 final [here· 
inafter Charter]. At a meeting of the European Council in Strasbourg, France on Decem· 
ber 8 and 9, 1989, the Heads of State and Government of II Members States adopted 
the Charter. BULL. EC 22-1989, point 2.1.104. 
•• Charter, supra note 21, at 1. 
.3 See, e.g., id. at § § 1,2,3, 15, 19,24,25 & 26. 
'4 Id. at § § 17 & 18 . 
• 5 Id. at § 17 . 
• 6 See Communication from the Commission Concerning its Action Programme Relat-
ing to the Implementation of the Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers, 
COM(89)568 final [hereinafter Action Programme]. 
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B. The Action Progamme 
1. Overview 
The Action Progamme builds on various EC Directives per-
taining to worker information, consultation, and participation.27 
The Action Progamme points out, however, that the internal 
European market created by EC 1992 "will accelerate mutations 
and restructuring of a large number of European industries."28 
The Action Progamme also acknowledges diversity on these sub-
jects among Member States, but claims that eventual standardiza-
tion is considered "necessary" within the Community. It further 
announces plans for appropriate legislative instruments to accom-
plish a consistent application of worker participation principles.29 
Thus, despite existing Directives, the general debate on the sub-
ject of worker participation clearly has been reopened. For ex-
ample, the Action Progamme's proposals for Community and 
Commission legislation have sparked an intense and important 
debate on worker information, consultation, participation, equity-
sharing, and other financial participation at European-scale un-
dertakings.30 
2. Commission Instrument on Worker Participation 
Individual Member State laws and policies on worker infor-
mation and consultation naturally do not control the conduct of 
businesses beyond national boundaries. Therefore, multinational 
companies in the EC may find that policy decisions made at 
corporate headquarters result in unequal treatment of employees 
company-wide.31 Worker participation procedures mandated by 
law in one nation may not suit the complex structure of corpo-
rations that operate in more than one Member State.32 The Com-
mission intends to deal with these issues by imposing a system of 
labor regulation on the entire EC. 
27 See id. at 17 (citing Directive 771187 on worker rights in event of transfer of firms, 
Directive 75/129 on collective redundancies, and Directive 80/987 on insolvency of em-
ployers). 
28 [d. at 3l. 
29 [d. 
30 See generally Leonard Bierman & Gerald Keirn, On the Economic Realities of the European 
Social Charter and the "Social Dimension" of EC 1992, 2 DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L LAW, 
(forthcoming 1992) (manuscript on file with author). 
3I See Action Programme, supra note 26, at 32. 
32 !d. 
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In the Action Progamme, the Commission elaborates on its 
legislative plan for labor standardization. It identifies the follow-
ing as key principles: (1) establishment of equivalent systems of 
worker representation in all European multinational enterprises; 
(2) periodic, scheduled provision of information to workers about 
the development of the enterprise and how it affects them; (3) 
employee involvement and consultation in decisions of serious 
consequence to employees, including closures, transfers, curtail-
ment of activities, long-term cooperation with other undertak-
ings, and substantial changes in corporate structure; and (4) cor-
porate responsibility to provide affiliates and subsidiaries with the 
information employees and their affiliates need. 33 
The Action Progamme is relatively specific on these issues com-
pared to the Community Charter, but by normal business stan-
dards, its worker participation proposals are still extremely vague. 
For example, the Action Program does not explain what is meant 
by "equivalent systems of worker representation," a point which 
will obviously require careful development. Similarly, the precise 
parameters of required employee involvement and consultation 
in employer decision making will have to be more specifically 
defined. 
3. Commission Instrument on Worker Participation in 
Financial Decisionmaking 
The Action Progamme definitely envisions that "worker partic-
ipation" involves the development of work rules and other man-
agement decisions with a direct impact on employees. It also 
anticipates worker participation in corporate financial decision-
making. As the Commission has noted previously, worker partic-
ipation in financial decisionmaking promotes "greater justice in 
the distribution of wealth" and a "means for attaining an adequate 
level of non-inflationary growth."34 The Commission thus intends 
to develop proposals dealing with financial participation by work-
ers.35 By "financial participation," the Commission means em-
ployees sharing in the profits, the capital growth or the capital of 
firms. It may also mean an actual redistribution of profits or 
capital to the salaried worker, in a form to be negotiated.36 
33 [d. at 33. 
34 [d. 
35 [d. 
36 [d. at 33-34. 
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IV. THE PROPOSED EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE 
A. Overview 
The notion of creating a genuine "European company," a "So-
cietas Europeae," subject to a new EC company law rather than 
the company laws of the Member States, was initially raised 
shortly after the Treaty of Rome established the Community.37 
The idea of supra-national European companies gained greater 
momentum over the next decade. In June 1970, the European 
Commission produced a massive draft regulation on the subject, 
comprising 284 articles and four annexes.38 A final version of 
this proposal incorporating the amendments of the European 
Assembly-the predecessor of the present European Parlia-
ment-was transmitted to the Council of Ministers on June 30, 
1975.39 
Further progress on the issue lagged until the Commission 
issued a White Paper on June 14, 1985 that recommended "com-
pleting the internal market."40 On June 8, 1988, the Commission 
issued a memorandum proposing a European Company Statute, 
and in May 1989, the Commission formally proposed a draft 
statute.41 The draft European Company Statute has two compo-
nents: (1) a "Regulation" addressing the technical, legal, and 
procedural aspects of creating a European Company; and (2) a 
"Directive" addressing employee involvement and participation 
issues.42 
Worker participation has always been a key provision in prior 
drafts of the European Company Statute.43 In many respects, this 
issue has been a major obstacle to enactment of such a statute.44 
The Commission's current proposed European Company Statute 
37 See Dominique Carreau & William L. Lee, Towards A European Company Law, 8 Nw. 
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 501, 501 (1989). 
38 Id. at 502. 
39 Id. 
40 See Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the 
European Council, COM(85)310 final. 
41 See Statute for a European Company, BULL. EUR. COMM. 5/89 at 37 [hereinafter 
Statute for a European Company). 
42 Id. 
43 See Carreau & Lee, supra note 37, at 508. 
44 Great Britain, in particular, has continually opposed the concept of "worker partic-
ipation" in the European Company Statute. See FIN. TIMES (London) Dec. 17, 1988, at 
14. 
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recognizes the extremely controversial nature of the worker par-
ticipation provisions. 
By breaking the proposed statute into two components, the 
Regulation and the Directive, the Commission hopes to segregate 
the potentially explosive issue of worker participation without 
damaging the heart of the proposed legislation.45 The Commis-
sion's efforts to segregate the issue of worker participation from 
the rest of the European Company Statute with artful drafting, 
however, have not been completely successful. The Regulation 
component addresses several employee involvement issues.46 For 
example, the Regulation would require employers seeking to es-
tablish a European company to discuss with their employees' 
representatives "the legal, economic and employment implica-
tions" of the company's formation. 47 The Regulation also imposes 
on the company's managing board an obligation to consider em-
ployee interests as they carry out their duties,48 and authorizes 
employee representatives to bring proceedings to dismiss mem-
bers of a company's board.49 Other sections of the Regulation 
address employee ownership and involvement in management.50 
It thus seems highly unlikely that the two-part structure of the 
proposed statute will shield the Commission, the European Par-
liament, or the Council of Ministers from the firestorm of debate 
over worker participation proposals. 
B. The Worker Participation Approach of the European Company 
Statute 
The European Company Statute's worker participation Direc-
tive proposes three models, each of which is designed to recognize 
employees' involvement in the European company, and "to make 
them feel that the business of the firm is their business."5l The 
Directive's Preamble elaborates on this theme, stating that in 
order to promote the Community's economic and social objec-
tives, employees must "participate in the supervision and strategic 
45 This attempt, however, has not been very successful. See infra notes 48-52 and 
accompanying text. 
46 See Statute for a European Company, supra note 41, at 45, 47, 55. 
47 Id. at 45. 
48 Id. at 55. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 47. 
51 Id. at 33. 
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development" of the European company. 52 Due to the "great 
diversity of rules and practices" concerning worker participation 
in Member States, however, the Commission cannot impose uni-
form rules on employee involvement in the European company. 
Consequently, Member States have the discretion under the Di-
rective to adopt any or all of the three models in their jurisdic-
tions, and companies may follow any of the models approved in 
the host nation. 
The European Company Statute's three worker participation 
models are set forth in Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the Statute's Direc-
tive. Under Article 4, which incorporates the German model, 
employees or their representatives have the right to appoint be-
tween one-third and one-half of their employer's supervisory or 
administrative board.53 Employee board representatives under 
Article 4 of the European Company Statute have similar respon-
sibilities as do employee board representatives under the 1976 
German Co-determination Act.54 Article 4 does not, however, 
contain any mandates regarding lower level worker participation 
such as those contained in the German Works Councils Act. 55 
Article 5 of the European Company Statute essentially incor-
porates the Franco-Italian worker participation systems, and pro-
vides for the establishment of the representative employee groups 
similar to the German works councils to represent a company's 
employees. Such representation is to occur in accordance with 
the host Member State's laws or practices. 56 Under this Article, 
these representative bodies of employees are provided with var-
ious specific rights including: (1) the right to quarterly informa-
tion from the company's management or administrative board 
regarding the progress of the company's business and that of its 
affiliates and subsidiaries; (2) the right, where necessary for the 
performance of their duties, to demand specific financial or other 
information about the company's business; and (3) the right to 
be informed and consulted by management before major cor-
porate decisions are implemented. 57 Article 5 also imposes a duty 
on employee representatives functioning pursuant to this Article 
52 /d. at 69. 
53 See id. at 70. 
54 See generally supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
55 See Statute for a European Company, supra note 41, at 70. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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to maintain the confidentiality of the business information pro-
vided by the employer. 58 
The final worker participation model, set forth in Article 6 of 
the European Company Statute, is a catch-all category inspired 
by the Swedish worker participation system. It provides that any 
other model may be established by agreement among the given 
parties. 59 In Sweden, the degree of worker participation in each 
company is essentially a contractual matter.60 The collective bar-
gaining agreement between the parties determines the extent of 
employee involvement. Article 6 does not give the parties com-
plete freedom in formulating their own worker participation 
schemes. Any agreement must provide essentially the same rights 
to information and consultation mandated in the works council 
model of Article 5.61 Employers must also finance the employee 
representative's negotiating costs for a worker participation 
agreement, including payment to their consultants or "experts."62 
If the parties fail to reach an agreement, they must adopt a 
standard model provided for by the law of the Member State and 
which assures employees basic informational and consultative 
rights.63 
The proposed European Company Statute does not permit the 
formation of a European company unless the company has 
chosen to adopt one of the Directive's three worker participation 
models.64 Member States retain only the discretion to restrict the 
choice and method of application of models for companies reg-
istered under the Statute in their territory.65 Member States do 
not retain the authority to exempt such companies from partici-
pating in the European Company Statute's worker participation 
scheme.66 Thus, Germany could specifically require that any Eu-
ropean company registering in that country adopt the model set 
forth in the European Company Statute Directive Article 4. Ger-
many, however, could not permit any such European company 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 See Alan C. Neal, Comment, A New Era for Collective Labor Law in Sweden, 26 AM. J. 
COM~ L. 609, 615 (1978). 
61 See Statute for a European Company, supra note 41, at 70-71; see also id. at 54. 
62 Id.at71. 
63 Id. 
64 /d. at 70. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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to completely opt out of the European Company Statute's worker 
participation requirements. 
The three models for worker participation in the proposed 
European Company Statute illustrate the stark contrast in ap-
proach on employee involvement issues between the United 
States and the EC. The European Company Statute requires, for 
example, that management provide employee representatives 
"with such financial and material resources as to enable them to 
meet and perform their duties in an appropriate manner."67 This 
provision is, of course, the direct antithesis of section 8(a)(2) of 
the U.S. NLRA,68 which outright prohibits employers from pro-
viding financial or other support to employee labor groups.69 
v. IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL DIMENSION PROPOSALS ON 
U.S. LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
A. Section 8(a)(2) 
As Professors John Dunlop and Derek Bok point out,70 the 
U.S. labor movement traditionally has been extremely wary of 
strong "social activism" or political involvement. Despite some 
brief attempts during the nineteenth century, a U.S. labor polit-
ical party has never emerged.71 Rather than put its efforts into 
"social unionism," the U.S. labor movement has instead favored 
"business unionism"-seeking greater benefits and other protec-
tions at the bargaining table.72 To this end, U.S. unions have 
traditionally eschewed worker participation and related em-
ployer-union schemes in favor of trying to gain greater bargain-
ing clout. 73 
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA directly incorporates this theme 
of union-management separation or bifurcation. This provision 
states that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to 
"dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of 
67 [d. at 71. 
68 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982). 
69 See generally JULIUS GETMAN & JOHN D. BLACKBURN, LABOR RELATIONS: LAW, PRAC-
TICE & POLICY 135-84 (1983). 
70 See DEREK C. BOK & JOHN DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 385-90 
(1970). 
7I See generally HARRY C. KATZ & THOMAS A. KOCHAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 142 (1992). 
72 See id. at 39, 142. 
73 See AFL-CIO Am. Fed. Oct. 1977, at 15 (statement of Lane Kirkland). 
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any labor organization or contribute financial or other support 
to it."74 Traditionally, the courts have interpreted this language 
quite literally, prohibiting any form of employer support by an 
organization that in any way resembles a "labor organization."75 
In recent years, however, section 8(a)(2) has come under in-
creasing attack. For example, in the prominent case of Hertzka & 
Knowles v. NLRB, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
noted that almost any form of employer cooperation, however 
innocuous, could be deemed unlawful "support" or "interfer-
ence" under section 8(a)(2).76 The court added, however, that 
such a view was "myopic" and cut against the broader objectives 
of the NLRA.77 This view was recently embraced by the U.S. 
Department of Labor in its highly controversial report entitled 
"Analysis of U.S. Labor Law and Future of Labor-Management 
Cooperation," the so-called "Schlossberg Report."78 This report 
takes the position that strong support for labor-management co-
operation and a revised view of section 8(a)(2) are necessary if 
the United States is going to compete effectively in the world 
marketplace. 79 
Current developments in the EC related to worker-manage-
ment cooperation could create pressure to change section 8(a)(2). 
This pressure will arise directly, as U.S. businesses compete with 
their European counterparts, and indirectly as the United States 
is exposed more to European worker participation models. Al-
though the highly adversarial model of labor-management rela-
tions encapsulated in section 8(a)(2) may be somewhat anachro-
nistic in today's global economy, some degree of labor-
management separation and institutional autonomy is probably 
quite useful.80 Nevertheless, developments in Europe will likely 
help spark increased interest in greater labor-management co-
operation, and possible reform of section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 
in the United States.81 
74 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982). 
75 See, e.g., Kaiser Foundation Hosp. Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 332 (1976). 
76 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 1974). 
77 Id. 
7S See Analysis of u.s. Labor Law and Future of Labor-Management Cooperation, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 116, at D-l, D-8-9 (June 17, 1986) [hereinafter Schlossberg Report]. 
79 Id. 
80 See Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Argument Against Judicial 
Revision of Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1662 (1983). 
81 For a good discussion of overall labor market cooperation in Europe see PAUL 
TEAGUE, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE SOCIAL DIMENSION (1989). 
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B. Information Disclosure 
United States labor law requires both employers and unions to 
furnish certain information to each other in the context of both 
collective bargaining and contract grievance administration.82 Al-
though the NLRA is silent on the issue, the National Labor Re-
lations Board (NLRB) and the courts have taken the position that 
the duty to furnish information is a corollary of the statutory 
obligation of both parties to bargain in good faith. 83 As a result, 
the duty is actually quite limited in scope, especially when com-
pared to the proposals being set forth as part of the social di-
mension of EC 1992. Although courts have found union requests 
for wage and wage-related data to be presumptively relevant, 
unions have had a much more difficult time obtaining corporate 
information outside this area.84 
The very broad information disclosure provisions contained in 
the EC 1992 social dimension proposals are likely to affect U.S. 
employers and unions in various ways. First, they are likely to 
renew calls made in the Schlossberg Report and by some 
scholars85 for an increased scope of union-management infor-
mation disclosure in this country. Given the current absence of 
explicit legislation on this subject, amendments to the NLRA 
mandating greater information exchange might be proposed. 
Second, it is quite possible that U.S. employers with EC operations 
might fall within the scope of the various proposed EC 1992 
mandates in this regard.86 Such employers would, of course, try 
to limit the scope of such disclosure to the maximum extent 
possible, likely arguing that the provisions apply only to the com-
pany's European subsidiaries, and not to the parent corporation. 
This situation portends a significant legal and policy battle-
ground. 
82 See generally John Fanning, The Obligation to Furnish Information During the Contract 
Term, 9 GA. L. REV. 375 (1975). 
83 See generally NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); NLRB v. Southland 
Cork Co., 342 F.2d 702, 706 (4th Cir. 1965). 
84 See, e.g., Washington Materials, Inc. v. NLRB, 803 F.2d 1333 (4th Cir. 1986); Inter-
national Wood Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 263 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1959); General 
AniLine and Film Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 1217, 1219-20 (1959). 
85 See Schlossberg Report, supra note 78, at D-9; see also Leslie Shedlin, Regulation of 
Disclosure of Economic and Financial Data and the Impact on the American System of Labor 
Management Relations, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 441 (1980). 
86 See generally The Kenneth Piper Lecture-Transnational Regulation of the Labor Relations 
of Multinational Enterprises, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 931-35 (1982) (statement by panelist 
Richard H. Weise, Vice President and General Counsel, Motorola, Inc.). 
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C. Union Representatives on Corporate Boards 
Union representation on U.S. corporate boards of directors 
has been quite limited to date, although the Schlossberg Report 
specifically called for increased representation of this kind.87 
Moreover, to the extent such representation exists it has generally 
come about through direct collective bargaining or other agree-
ments between parties.88 The European Company Statute and 
EC 1992 proposals, however, envision broad-scale union repre-
sentation on company boards, a development likely to increase 
the impetus for such participation in the United States. 
To the extent this representation is going to happen in the 
United States, however, Congress and the courts will have to 
rethink some of the legal strictures which currently make this 
country a less hospitable place for union company directors than 
many European countries. For example, the Landrum-Griffin 
Act places a strong fiduciary duty on any union official who joins 
a corporate board to act in the union membership's interest.89 
This duty, however, directly conflicts with the fiduciary duty of 
any corporate director to represent the interests of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.90 Moreover, U.S. antitrust law clearly 
prohibits a person from serving as a director in any two or more 
corporations at the same time if the corporations are competi-
tors. 91 In short, if the notion of having union participation on 
corporate boards is going to take greater hold in the United 
States, some direct attention must be focused on current legal 
impediments to such an approach.92 
D. Worker Financial Participation 
Various EC 1992 social dimension proposals, especially the 
Action Progamme, clearly call for increased worker financial par-
87 Schlossberg Report, supra note 78, at D-IO-ll. 
88 See generally Douglas Fraser, Worker Participation in Corporate Government the U.A.W.-
Chrysler Experience, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 949 (1982). 
89 See 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982). 
90 See 3 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
§ 838 (1965). 
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1982). 
92 See generally John Blackburn, Worker Participation on Corporate Directorates: Is America 
Ready for Iruiustrial Democracy? 18 Hous. L. REV. 349 (1981); Brian Hamer, Note, Serving 
Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards of Directors, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 639 
(1981). 
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ticipation in firms. These proposals may create pressures for 
similar worker participation in U.S. firms. Over the past decade, 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and related employee 
ownership mechanisms have grown considerably in the United 
States.93 A number of these plans have come about, however, as 
part of overall schemes to save distressed companies. Thus, for 
example, the creation of an ESOP at the Chrysler Corporation 
was an explicit condition in the 1979 "bailout" legislation Con-
gress passed for the company.94 At Pan American World Airways 
in the early 1980s, unions representing the company's hourly 
workers agreed to a 10 percent wage cut and a wage freeze in 
exchange for the creation of an ESOP which would give those 
employees at least 12 percent of the company's stock.95 There 
may be significant productivity and other benefits from employee 
ownership plans even when a company is not facing financial 
hardship. If nothing else, the broad-scale proposals advanced by 
the EC as part of EC 1992 are likely to engender increased 
attention to the issue in the United States. 
E. E mployment-at-Will 
One of the most controversial issues in the field of industrial 
relations today is that of "employment-at-wiI1."96 Traditionally, 
employment in the United States has been "at will"-employees 
can quit their job at any time for any reason, while conversely, 
employers can discharge employees at any time and for any rea-
son.97 Recently in the EC, however, employment-at-will generally 
has not been the rule. Great Britain and other countries have 
enacted unjust dismissal laws which mandate that employees can 
only be discharged for 'just cause."98 The current EC 1992 social 
dimension proposals tend to strengthen worker rights by provid-
93 See Olson, Union Experiences With Workers Ownership: Legal and Practical Issues Raised 
by ESOPS, TRASOPS, Stocks Purchases and Co-Operatives, 1982 WISCONSIN L. REv. 729. 
94 Id. at 776-77. 
95 Id. at 778-79. 
96 See Leonard Bierman & Stuart A. Youngblood, Employment-At-Will and the South 
Carolina Experiment, 7 IND. REL. L.J. 28 (1985). 
97 See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the 
Abusive Exercise of Emplower Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405-06 (1967). 
98 See, e.g., Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, Part V (British law). 
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ing for employee consultation and involvement in job reductions 
and other decisions.99 
A classic article published in 1976 by Professor Clyde W. Sum-
mers drew heavily on the European experience in advocating the 
enactment of an unjust dismissal statute in the United States. IOO 
In response to this article and other scholarly contributions, 101 
various state courts began creating judicial exceptions to the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine. 102 For example, a number of state 
courts have held that an employee cannot be fired for serving on 
a jury or for other public policy reasons. 103 Moreover, the state 
of Montana has recently enacted a comprehensive statute prohib-
iting unjust dismissal. 104 The general increased protection in this 
regard contained in the EC 1992 proposals may well create fur-
ther impetus for change in this area in the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
The commg economic unification of the EC is a milestone 
event, and the worker participation/social dimension elements of 
this unification are of considerable importance. Indeed, these 
elements of the unification have, at least to date, been some of 
its most controversial. These proposals have been part of not only 
the Commission's Community Charter and Action Progamme, 
but also of the proposed European Company Statute. 
Regardless of how the battle over these proposals turns out in 
Europe, it is fair to say that they already have had, and will 
continue to have, significant implications for U.S. labor-manage-
ment relations. If nothing else, they are likely to force renewed 
99 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
100 See Clyde w. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 
62 VA. L. REv. 481, 508-32 (1976). 
101 See, e.g., Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to 
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980); Note, Protecting Employees 
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1931 (1983); 
Richard J. Pratt, Comment, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks: Further En-
croachments on the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 198 (1990). 
102 See, e.g., Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So.2d 725 (Ala. 1987); Cleary v. 
American Airlines, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980). 
103 See, e.g., Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981); Reuther v. 
Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. 1978); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 
(Or. 1975). 
104 See Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-901-914 (1987). 
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attention to a whole host of issues raised by the Schlossberg 
Report, including possible reform of section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 
greater employer duties of information disclosure, increased 
union representation on company boards, and increased em-
ployee financial participation in firms. The EC proposals may 
also increase the pressure for greater statutory protections for 
workers. 
